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AN INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC VAT IN MICHIGAN –
OBJECTIVE VALUATION IN THE RETAIL GASOLINE TRADE
Richard T. Ainsworth
New York adopted an industry-specific value added tax (VAT) to solve problems
with virtual intermediaries (room remarketers) under its hotel accommodations tax.1 The
New York VAT resembles the VAT used in the European Union (EU). It is a creditinvoice VAT2 that subjectively values supplies.3
Michigan has also adopted an industry-specific credit-invoice VAT, however the
targeted industry is the retail gasoline trade. The valuation method is objective, rather
than subjective. In valuing supplies objectively rather than subjectively, the Michigan
VAT resembles the exception provisions that are found in most VATs around the globe.
Objective valuations are used in VATs when dealing with inherently problematical
transaction types.4
The central point is that Michigan, like New York, has departed from the
traditional American approach of taxing consumption in a single stage (directly from the
consumer through a retail sales tax). Michigan is doing this because it wants to capture
the administrative benefits of utilizing a multi-stage levy. What New York and Michigan
are interested in securing is:
 a larger and more stable and revenue flow through the VAT’s fractioned payment
mechanism, and
 a more easily audited tax regime through a leveraging of the VAT’s selfenforcement mechanisms.

1

Richard T. Ainsworth, New York Adopts a VAT, 61 STATE TAX NOTES 223 (July 25, 2011).
Alan Schenk & Oliver Oldman, VALUE ADDED TAX – A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2007) at 38, defining
the credit-invoice VAT and indicating that it is the dominant VAT model in the world.
The most prevalent method for calculating VAT worldwide is the credit-invoice VAT (or
invoice VAT) that relies on a tax-against-a-tax-methodology. This form of VAT was
established after World War II in Western European countries (countries now members
of the EU). Including the other elements in the description of the credit-invoice VAT, the
EU-style VAT reaches international transactions under the destination principle, imposes
tax on a consumption base, and typically calculates output tax on tax-exclusive prices.
3
Case 230/87, Naturally Yours Cosmetics Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excises, 1988 E.C.R.
6365 at ¶ 16 (expressly holding that a subjective valuation, not an objective valuation applies in EU VAT,
“… since the basis of assessment is the consideration actually received and not a value estimated according
to objective criteria.”).
4
This is the case in the EU. See: VAT DIRECTIVE Art. 395(1). This article has always permitted EU
Member States to derogate from subjective valuation and apply objective valuation (called “the open
market value” in the Directive). Commission approval was needed to derogate, and the Commission made
it clear that it preferred open market valuation measures that were limited in scope and duration. As of July
24, 2006 the “Rationalization Directive” changed this, and now allows Member States to elect objective
valuations in most related party transactions. VAT DIRECTIVE, Arts. 72 & 80. [On November 28, 2006 the
SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE was repealed and replaced with the RECAST VAT DIRECTIVE (VAT
DIRECTIVE). Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the Common system of value added tax, O.J. (L 347) 1].
2
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This paper considers Michigan’s objectively valued, industry-specific, creditinvoice VAT in the retail gasoline trade in three parts. It briefly defines a credit-invoice
VAT and explains the difference between subjective and objective valuation
methodologies. Second, the Michigan statute is set out in a manner that makes the VAT
framework upon which it is built more apparent. Third, the current Illinois investigation
into retail gasoline tax fraud is considered. Illinois contrasts well with Michigan, because
Illinois modified its sales tax on gasoline (effective January 1, 2011) to bring it into rough
alignment with Michigan’s VAT.
Illinois’ intent is to find a statutory “fix” to the fraud. Illinois does not follow
Michigan completely, because the Illinois tax does not involve the entire commercial
chain. It involves only two stages. It does however employ an objective valuation in a
multi-stage ad valorem structure. But, it could (and probably should) go further.
This paper concludes with a couple of suggestions. First, it suggests that it might
be valuable for both Michigan and Illinois to look at the New York VAT in hotel
accommodations. The New York VAT uses a far more conventional subjective valuation
methodology, and does so to great advantage. Stated another way, from a global VAT
perspective, it is not apparent that the retail gasoline trade presents the kinds of
administrative problems with valuation that would warrant use of an exceptional
valuation methodology – objective valuation.
Secondly, as long as Michigan and possibly Illinois are looking at VATs in the
gasoline trade they might consider going the next step and incorporating fraud prevention
technologies in the administration of their taxes. Fraud prevention technologies are being
installed in VAT jurisdictions globally. VATs, just like the retail sales tax, are vulnerable
to sales suppression frauds at the final stage (the sale by the retailer to final consumer).
Although the percent of revenue lost to this fraud in VATs is not as great as under the
retail sales tax, enforcement of the gasoline tax would be much easier with these
technologies than without them.
VAT/GST5
Like the retail sales tax, a value added tax is an ad valorem tax. However, instead
of collecting the full tax on value at the point of final consumption, a VAT collects the
tax in slices all along the supply chain measured by the value added at each stage. As
Schenk and Oldman indicate:
A value added tax (VAT) is a generic name associated with a multistage
tax that is levied on the value added by each business firm at every stage
of production of goods and services.6

5

New Zealand, for example, calls its VAT a goods and services tax (GST). A GST is simply another name
for a VAT. The expression “VAT” is closely associated with the EU, whereas the expression “GST” is
popular in many of the former UK colonies (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, and South
Africa).
6
Schenk & Oldman, supra note 2 at 30.
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However, even though VATs are ad valorem taxes, they differ among each other.
There are also internal differences on how they determine value for specific transactions.
When value is subjectively determined, the tax is based on the price actually agreed to
between the parties. The price placed on the invoice is the value upon which the tax is
determined. When value is objectively determined the tax is based on the fair market
value of the supply, or the price that a willing buyer would agree to pay, and willing
seller would agree to accept in a freely negotiated exchange. This may or may not be the
price recorded on the invoice, and for this reason when objective measures are used they
add complexity to the VAT.
For example, assume a VAT rate of 10%. Assume further that A owns an item
that regularly sells in the marketplace for $100, and also assume that A agrees to sell it to
B in a taxable transaction for $75.7 In a jurisdiction that determines the VAT due with an
objective measure of value, the tax would be $10 (10% x $100 = $10). However, in a
jurisdiction that determined the VAT due with a subjective measure of value, the tax
would be $7.50 (10% x $75 = $7.50). Admittedly, in most cases objective values will be
the same as subjective values, because the price that two parties agree on will often be the
best evidence available of the objective value of an item in the marketplace.
No VAT today functions entirely on objective valuation. VAT is determined in
the vast majority of transactions by multiplying the appropriate rate times the stated
invoice price.8 However, in a gift there is no invoice and no consideration. Jurisdictions
that wish to make gifts taxable under their VAT reach gifts through objective valuations.9
7

The reason for this discount could be “A’s” excess inventory, or cash flow problems, or it could be that
“B” in this instance simply drove a “hard bargain” and “A” relented and sold for less than he could have
gotten if he waited or sold to a different party.
8
One of the primary reasons for not adopting objective valuations is the amount of effort such a valuation
methodology entails. If determining this value were the obligation of the taxpayer in every case the VAT
would be hopelessly complex. There would be issues about what was the proper “marketplace” where
measurements could be taken as well as issues about gradations in the quality (or quantity) of the supplies
involved. Michigan and Illinois avoid these problems by valuing all sales at a retail market level
(regardless of the level of the market involved) and determining that all gasoline is measured by the
statewide average retail price of a gallon of self-serve unleaded regular. But, even more is done to make
objective valuation work. Michigan and Illinois do not ask the taxpayer to conduct valuation studies. The
state performs this measurement for the taxpayer, and holds the measurement constant for six months.
9
For example, the New Zealand GST has a very broad concept of a taxable supply. It includes gifts, as
well as the provision of goods and services. [GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at §5] To reach
gifts the New Zealand definition of consideration is similarly broad and requires objective valuations.
[GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at §21)].
South Africa however differs on this point and rather than getting involved in trying to objectively
value gift transactions it expressly exempts them. 1991 SA REVENUE 89; REVENUE, VALUE-ADDED TAX
ACT No. 89 of 1991 at § 10(23) (South Africa)
Save as otherwise provided in this section, where any supply is made for no consideration
the value of the supply shall be deemed nil.
A nearly identical provision is found in 1991 REPUBLIC OF FIJI 45; VALUE ADDED TAX DECREE No. 45 of
1991 at § 19(14).
Other jurisdictions reach the same result as South Africa and Fiji by defining taxable supplies as a
transaction that includes consideration, as in Australia. A NEW TAX SYSTEM (GOODS AND SERVICES TAX)
ACT, 1991 at Paragraph 9-5(a).
9-5 Taxable supplies
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The other common situation where VATs resort to objective valuation is where the
transaction itself is inherently suspect. This commonly occurs when the transaction is
between related parties.10 Needless to say, the retail gas trade is not a series of gift
transactions, and although some of the commercial parties may be related, this is not a
general characteristic of the trade.

You make a taxable supply if:
(a) you make the supply for *consideration; and
(b) the supply is made in the course or furtherance of an *enterprise
that you *carry on; and
(c) the supply is *connected with Australia; and
(d) you are *registered, or *required to be registered.
However, the supply is not a *taxable supply to the extent that it is *GST-free or
*input taxed. (emphasis in original)
Regulatory guidance is then applied to make it clear that, “GST is not payable on a supply unless
it is made for consideration …” AUST. GOODS AND SERVICES TAX RUL (GSTR 2001/6) Goods and
Services Tax: Non-Monetary Consideration at ¶ 56.
10
For example, consider the Canadian GST. At EXCISE TAX ACT, R.S.C., ch. E-15, § 154(1) (Can.) sets
out the main Canadian valuation rule for subjective valuation as follows:
…every recipient of a taxable supply made in Canada shall pay … tax in respect of the
supply calculated … on the value of the consideration for the supply.
And as § 153(1) further clarifies:
… the value of the consideration, or any part thereof, for a supply shall, for the purposes
of this Part, be deemed to be equal to
(a) where the consideration or that part is expressed in money, the amount of the
money; and
(b) where the consideration or that part is other than money, the fair market
value of the consideration or that part at the time the supply was made.
However, in cases where a supply is made between persons that are not dealing at arm’s length the
Canadian statute shifts from a subjective to objective valuation in instances where the recipient does not
qualify for a full input credit on the supply (consumers, small suppliers and persons engaged in exempt
activities, such as financial institutions and universities). In these instances § 155(1) provides that the value
of the supply is a value equal to the fair market value of the property or service.
(1) For the purposes of this Part, where a supply of property or a service is made between
persons not dealing with each other at arm’s length for no consideration or for
consideration less than the fair market value of the property or service at the time the
supply is made, and the recipient of the supply is not a registrant who is acquiring the
property or service for consumption, use or supply exclusively in the course of
commercial activities of the recipient,
(a) if no consideration is paid for the supply, the supply shall be deemed to be
made for consideration, paid at that time, of a value equal to the fair market
value of the property or service at that time; and
(b) if consideration is paid for the supply, the value of the consideration shall be
deemed to be equal to the fair market value of the property or service at that
time. (emphasis supplied)
See also REVENUE CANADA, GST MEMORANDA G300-7 VALUE OF SUPPLY (GST 300-7) at ¶¶2023, available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/gm/g300-7/README.html.
Singapore does the same at: GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, Cap 117A, at §17(3) &
Third Schedule § 1(1)(c) (Sing.); (3) Australia is similar at: A NEW TAX SYSTEM (GOODS AND
SERVICES TAX) ACT, 1991 at ¶ 72-5(1)(a) & (b) (concerning supplies without consideration) and
at ¶ 72-70(2)(a) & (b) (concerning supplies with inadequate consideration). New Zealand makes
the same distinction at: GOODS AND SERVICES TAX ACT, 1985 (N.Z.) at §10(3)(b) & (c).

4
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1939231

The Icelandic VAT for example, permits objective valuations as an exception. It
sets out an objective measure for the “tax price” for use in situations where subjective
valuations are difficult to determine. It then goes one step further and provides that a
cost-plus methodology will be used to determine an objective measure of value where no
marketplace exists within which to establish a price-referenced objective valuation. The
Icelandic VAT states:
When goods or services are exchanged or goods are handed over without
charge, the tax price shall be based upon the general price in similar
transactions. Should such a general price not be available the tax price
shall be based on the calculated sales price where account is taken of all
cost plus the markup generally used for goods and services in a similar
category.11
Thus, objective valuation is an exception, not the main rule. Iceland’s approach is
standard; Michigan’s approach is unusual.
MICHIGAN’S VAT
Michigan converted it’s single stage retail sales tax on gasoline to a multi-stage
tax by requiring the entire commercial (gasoline) chain in Michigan to pay (and collect
from one another) an amount of tax calculated by applying the current sales tax rate to the
statewide average retail price of a gallon of self-serve unleaded regular.12 Technically, at
all stages before the final retail stage, this tax operates like a specific duty not a value
added tax. The value added at each stage is not being taxed. Just the presumed value of
the final retail sale is being taxed. At all stages before the final sale valuation is
objective, not subjective.
The value of all gasoline (high-grade, low-grade, self-service, and full-service) is
presumed to have the same value as the value of self-serve unleaded regular. The tax on
this value is a constant, and remains constant for six months.13 It is set by the current
retail sales tax rate and a survey. This constant charge is converted to a “cents-pergallon” levy by the Michigan Department of the Treasury twice a year.14 In effect,
Michigan is dealing with the complexity of an objective valuation tax by doing the
market analysis itself, making twice-yearly changes to the cents-per-gallon charge, and
then requiring the entire retail gas trade in the state to adjust tax collection and reporting
as the changes are implemented. None of this would be necessary under subjective
valuation.
The Michigan VAT works like this. Assume 10 gallons of any type of gasoline is
sold by a refiner (pipeline terminal operator, or maritime terminal operator) to a
wholesaler, then to a distributor, and on to a retailer who sells to a final consumer.
Assume further that the value of self-service regular is determined to be $4.00 per gallon.
11

VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, No. 50 at Art. 8 (1998) (Iceland).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.56a(1).
13
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.6a (allowing taxpayers to rely on Revenue Administration Bulletins setting the
valuation rates).
14
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.56a
12
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Therefore, at the current 6% rate15 each of the four businesses in this commercial chain
would be required to collect $2.40 in tax (10 x $4.00 x 6% = $2.40)16 from the next
business in line for the 10 gallons sold. Only the refiner’s and the retailer’s return will be
returned with tax (in this example). Each of the intermediaries (the wholesaler, the
distributor, and the retailer) would offset the $2.40 in tax collected with a $2.40 credit for
taxes paid.17 For the wholesaler and the distributor this would produce a zero return.18
Only when the retailer sells to the final consumer is the true value of the gasoline
measured and taxed. The retailer collects tax based on a subjective valuation (the invoice
price, or the price at the pump). The actual price per gallon may be higher or lower than
the presumed $4.00 per gallon, but the rate remains 6% and the tax finally paid will
reflect a $2.40 credit taken for the tax paid by the retailer on his purchase from the
distributor.
Thus, even though tax is collected at each stage of the retail gasoline trade,
Michigan collects revenue at only two stages – the first19 and the last.20 This compromise
results from Michigan’s preference for objective valuation, and rather than determining a
separate objective valuation for each discrete level of the market (refiner, wholesaler,
distributor, and retailer), Michigan uses the same market (the retail price of a gallon of
self-serve unleaded regular) at all levels. This compromise does not diminish the VATs
traditional benefits:
 there is a stable revenue flow, received in (two) stages through a fractioned
payment mechanism, and
 there is a self-checking, self-enforcing mechanism in the commercial chain that
does not burden businesses that pay the tax,21 because the tax is immediately
credited when collected from the next business in the chain22 – and this provides a
clear audit trail for the tax administration.
15

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.93(1)
Reduced to a “cents-per-gallon” amount, this example is based on 24 cents per gallon. After it’s most
recent survey of self-serve unleaded regular gasoline the Michigan Department of the Treasury determined
that the prepayment per gallon of gasoline (as of September 1, 2011) is 21.3 cents per gallon. Michigan
Department of the Treasury, Revenue Administration Bulletin 2011-3 at 3, available at:
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/RAB2011-3_358465_7.pdf
17
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.56a(3)
18
Assuming, of course, that the gasoline is bought and sold in the same six-month period. For gas bought
in one period and re-sold in another period different rates could well apply.
19
Remittances are due from refiners (pipeline terminal operators, and marine terminal operators) for all
amounts received after the end of the prior month and before the 16th of the current month on or before the
25th of the month. Payments received after the 15th and the end of the month must be remitted on or before
the 10th of the next month. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.56a(4).
20
Retailers follow the normal sales tax schedule for returns and remittances, which is (generally) on or
before the 20th day of each month for the taxes collected the preceding month. MICH. COMP. LAWS §
205.56(1) & MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.96(1)
21
There is, of course, an administrative burden in filing tax returns, but the financial burden should end
with the cost of completing the return. No additional taxes should be due. Timing issues are possible.
22
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.56a(3) (indicating that the actual credit taken on a return is for the difference
between the amount of the tax paid, and the amount of tax collected, thereby allowing the intermediary to
reimburse himself for taxes paid from the taxes collected, with only differences reported for refunds or
payments).
16
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ILLINOIS VAT
Beginning on March 1, 1984 Illinois required gasoline retailers to prepay three
cents per gallon to their distributor, supplier or other reseller as an advance payment of
the Retailers’ Occupation Tax (ROT). The full amount would be collected from the
customer at the time of a final sale, and reported by the retailer.23 A credit was allowed
against the ROT for prepaid taxes.24 Distributors, suppliers, or other resellers of motor
fuel were required to remit the prepaid ROT monthly.
On July 1, 2003 Illinois changed the prepayment tax rates,25 but the structure of
the tax was unchanged. Gasohol was now taxed at five cents per gallon, and other motor
fuels at six cents per gallon. Certain other fuels were exempt.26
Applying the same example used for Michigan above, the Illinois ROT works as
follows. Assume 10 gallons of any type of gasoline is sold by a refiner (pipeline terminal
operator, or maritime terminal operator) to a wholesaler, then to a distributor, and on to a
retailer who sells to a final consumer. Assume further that the value of this gasoline at
retail is $4.00 per gallon. In this case the refiner will collect nothing from the wholesaler,
and the wholesaler will collect nothing from the distributor. The distributor will collect 6
cents per gallon from the retailer (60 cents) and (a) remit this amount with its monthly
return27 and (b) provide the retailer (and the Department of Revenue) with a statement of
the tax paid no later than the 20th day of the following month.28 The retailer will collect
$2.50 from the consumer (10 x $4.00 x 6.25% = $2.50). The retailer’s return will take a
credit for 60 cents, and remit $1.90 ($2.50 less $0.60 = $1.90).
In spite of this prepayment regime, the Illinois Attorney General indicates that
fraud at the retail level is “pervasive.”29 The Illinois gas tax is not “self-enforcing” (like
a VAT), and the reason is easy to identify:
 The amount of the prepayment (five or six cents per gallon) is less than 20% of
the tax collected on the final retail sale and it is not sufficient to deter fraud.
Unreported (cash) sales30 to consumers31 provide (roughly) a twenty-cent per
gallon “tax profit.”
23

Prepaid Sales Tax on Motor Fuel Public Act 83-1080 (HB-1133).
Illinois Department of Revenue, Information Bulletin FY 84-27 (Feb. 1, 1984)
25
Illinois Department of Revenue, Information Bulletin FY 2004-05 (July 1, 2003)
26
Exemptions applied to majority blended ethanol fuel, 100% biodiesel, and qualifying biodiesel fuel
blends.
27
86 ILL. ADM. CODE §130.551. The form involved in this notification process is the four-part form PST2. Parts A and B are completed by retailers and submitted with tax returns (part A) and kept for records
(part B). The wholesaler will complete a separate form PST-2 and submit part C with the tax return and
keep part D for records. The purpose of this filing is to allow the tax administration to check fuel purchases
and tax payments.
28
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2d; 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2e
29
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan cited in: Melissa Harris, Madigan: Tax Fraud Among Gas
Stations Operators is “Pervasive,” Chicago Tribune (Sept. 25, 2011) available at:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0925-gas-tax-20110925,0,6417746.story
30
There is an assumption that gasoline fraud occurs primarily in cash sales, because credit card transaction
will leave a digital trail.
24
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The prepaid ROT relies on the accuracy of the distributor’s reporting, but does not
incentivize its accuracy. Gasoline middlemen legitimately make taxable and nontaxable supplies (depending on their customer’s commercial status), and as a
result, incentives develop for the retailer to split-the-profits of the fraud with their
suppliers to secure untaxed gasoline.

When gasoline retailer profit margins are examined it becomes clear why the
ROT is not a “self-enforcing” tax. In 2010 the average (gross) profit margin for gasoline
retailers was 16.9 cents per gallon. In 2009 the margin was 10.3 cents.32 Average selling
expenses reduce this amount between 8 to 12 cents per gallon.33 Thus, in an environment
where profit margins are very thin (2 to 6 cents per gallon) the Illinois “tax margin”34 can
be ten times greater than the “normal” profit per gallon (amounts may vary depending on
whether the gasoline is branded or unbranded, with unbranded margins being higher).35
Because fraud was suspected, the Illinois Attorney General began an investigation
of gasoline retailers in 2008. The investigation (ongoing as of October 2011) has
identified 651 gasoline operators allegedly involved in cheating on the ROT. If
ultimately proven, this would mean that more that 27% of the gasoline retailers in Illinois
engage in tax fraud.36 $54 million in taxes have been recovered.37
The statutory response to the Attorney General’s investigation has been to raise
the flat cents-per-gallon rate under the former law to an estimated measure of the full
ROT amount due, determined under the Michigan’s objective valuation methodology.
Therefore, effective January 1, 2011 and continuing every six months thereafter, the
Illinois Department of Revenue will determine the prepayment rate by multiplying the
average selling price of motor fuel in the state (for the previous six months) by 6.25%,38
and converting this amount to a cents-per-gallon charge. The whole amount will be the
prepayment amount. As Chicago Business notes,

31

Taking an average self-serve regular price for gasoline in Chicago at $4.00 per gallon, times the 6.25%
tax rate yields a 25 cent per gallon tax. See: CBS Chicago, Once Again Chicago has the Nation’s Highest
Gas Prices (September 12, 2011) (indicating that the average price is $4.02) available at:
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/09/12/chicago-once-again-has-nations-highest-gas-prices/
32
NACS Online (National Association of Convenience Stores) First Half of 2010 Shows Strong Profit
Margins for Gasoline Retailers, (July 2, 2010) available at:
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/News/Daily/Pages/ND0702107.aspx
33
Scott Horsley, Gas Stations Profit from More that Just Gas, NPR (National Public Radio) (June 5, 2007)
(citing average costs per gallon for payroll [4 cents], rent [4 cents] and credit card fees [4 cents]) available
at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10733468
34
If the 6.25% tax on $4.00 per gallon gasoline is 25 cents, and if a retailer pays the prepayment ROT of 6
cents per gallon, the profits from fraud would be 19 cents per gallon. If the gasoline retailer could secure
supplies without prepayment ROT the profits would be a full 25 cents per gallon. The retailer could “split”
this profit by overpaying for gasoline that was untaxed.
35
Id.
36
Melissa Harris, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, supra29 note 29.
37
Id.
38
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2d(e)
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In a bid to stamp out tax evasion, starting in January, gas stations will have
to pay 100% of their estimated sales taxes upfront when they take delivery
of fuel from distributors …39
This is not quite enough to call the Illinois ROT on gasoline a VAT. Illinois has
not gone as far as Michigan, and has not achieved the full range of administrative benefits
that Michigan has achieved.
Only the gasoline retailer, not the entire commercial chain, prepays the ROT.
There is a fractioned payment. Most of the ROT is pre-paid by the retailer, and remitted
by the distributor. The remnant of the ROT (if any) is collected by the retailer from the
final consumer, and remitted on the retailer’s return. Because there are only two parties
paying the tax over to the government (the retailer and the distributor), the ROT is not as
strongly self-enforcing as the Michigan retail sales tax on gasoline, the NY VAT in hotel
accommodations, or any of the major VAT systems around the globe. The ROT’s
weakness stems from not involving the entire commercial chain in the prepayment
regime. In contract with the Michigan VAT, the Illinois ROT remains vulnerable to
collusion between the distributor and the retailer.
CONCLUSION
With rising gasoline prices, and razor thin profit margins in retail gasoline sales,
jurisdictions that impose significant ad valorem consumption taxes on gasoline create a
breeding ground for fraud. Six other states have statutes similar to those in Michigan and
Illinois with ad valorem taxes on gasoline – California (6%), Georgia (4%), Hawaii (4%),
Indiana (6%), Kentucky (9% of the average wholesale price of gasoline in the state), and
West Virginia (5% variable wholesale tax on the statewide average wholesale price for
gasoline in the state).
When profit margins fall to 5 cents per gallon (or less), and taxes rise to 25 cents
per gallon (or more), as they did in Illinois, it is reasonable to anticipate that some
retailers will suppress cash sales (if their internal systems and business relationships
allows them to do so). This will permit the retailer to either directly increase profits or to
drive business to more profitable convenience store offerings at the same location. There
is anecdotal evidence that this is exactly what happened in Illinois.
[Illinois Department of Revenue Director Brian] Hamer believes the
cheating has been going on for some time but peaked in 2008 when gas
prices "went through the roof." [The Executive President of the Illinois
Petroleum Marketer’s Association William] Fleischli's theory is that the
cheaters used the scam to boost their overall business. Lower prices [from
tax reduced gasoline] would drive more traffic into a station's car wash or

39

Paul Merrion, Illinois Cracks Down on Gas Cheats, Chicago Business (December 20, 2010) available at:
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20101218/ISSUE01/312189984/illinois-cracks-down-on-gas-taxcheats#axzz18y484aek.
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minimart, where sales of bottled water, for instance, provide higher profit
margins than gasoline.40
However, razor thin profit margins point in another direction. They suggest that
Michigan and Illinois could easily move to subjective valuation in their prepaid gasoline
tax regimes. Low profit margins suggest that the “value added” at the final stage of the
retail gasoline trade is relatively low, and the tax could be structured (like a VAT) so that
6% (Michigan) or 6.25% (Illinois) of the invoice price for gasoline is due at each stage
along the commercial chain. This would:
 eliminate the need for the revenue administration to determine the statewide
average retail price of a gallon of self-serve unleaded regular twice a year, and
convert it to a workable cents-per-gallon charge – the tax would automatically
(and immediately) track price changes in gasoline,
 align the tax more closely with the type of gasoline purchased – more expensive
grades would be assessed a higher tax, and lower grades a lower tax, and
 eliminate the search for mismatched purchases (possibly from multiple providers)
with retail gasoline sales, and then subdividing these sales among the various
grades of gasoline and types of service (self-service and full service) charges – in
Illinois this function is embodied in the four-part PST-2 form.
If Michigan moved to subjective valuation it would have a fully recognizable
VAT on an EU model, similar to the VAT adopted by New York in its hotel
accommodations tax. The tax on gasoline would be collected in slices all along the
commercial chain in accord with the subjective value that was added at that stage.
The same would not be true for Illinois, because the ROT in the retail gasoline
trade is binary (only the distributor and the retailer are involved). Illinois would need to
include the entire commercial chain in the tax regime (like Michigan). Doing this would
solve one of Illinois’ major problems with the current tax system – distributors would
now be incentivized to accurately report purchases and re-sales of gasoline, because their
tax refund would hang in the balance. Presently their incentive is to cooperate as much
as possible with the retailer.
There is a second side to the fraud problem that Illinois (and perhaps Michigan) is
struggling with. If it is possible through the adoption of a VAT-like structure in the retail
gasoline trade to accurately collect taxes on all the value added up to the purchases made
by the retailer, fraud may still not be eliminated. Cash sales to final customers can be
suppressed. VATs do not prevent suppression fraud; they only reduce the amount of tax
that can be lost through suppression.41 Collecting the full tax on the value added at the
final stage remains a problem.
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Melissa Harris, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, supra note 29.
Richard T. Ainsworth & Urs Hengartner, Quebec’s Sales Recording Module (SRM): Fighting the
Zapper, Phantomware, and Tax Fraud with Technology, 57 CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL 715 (2009)
(examining sales suppression fraud in Quebec and the solutions offered in Quebec and the EU).
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For example, if tax is collected on the value of 10 gallons of gasoline that pass
through a commercial chain to a retailer, it is still possible for the retailer to sell all 10
gallons to final customers, report sales of 9, and retain the tax42 and the profit from the
tenth gallon. This is most common when final sales are in cash and when records of the
sale can be digitally eliminated from business records.
Skimming cash receipts is an old-fashioned tax fraud. Businesses that skim
frequently keep two sets of books (one for the tax man, the other for the owner). In its
simplest (non-technological) form there are two tills, and the cashier simply diverts some
cash from selected sales into a secret drawer. A record of the diversion may be
maintained, but it will be kept outside the formal accounting system.43
Technology is changing how businesses skim. The agents of change are software
applications – phantom-ware and zappers. Phantom-ware is a “hidden,” pre-installed
programming option(s) embedded within the operating system of a modern electronic
cash register (ECR). It can be used to create a virtual second till and may preserve a
digital (off-line) record of the skimming (a second set of digital books). The physical
diversion of funds into a second drawer is no longer required, and the need for manual
recordkeeping of the skim is eliminated. Because phantom-ware programming is part of
the operating system of an ECR its use can be detected with the assistance of a computer
audit specialist.
Zappers are more advanced. Zappers are special programs added to ECRs or
point of sale (POS) networks. They are carried on memory sticks, removable CDs or can
be accessed through an internet link. Because zappers are not integrated into operating
systems their use is more difficult to detect. Zappers liberate owners from the need to
personally operate the cash register. Remote skimming of cash transactions is possible
without the knowing participation of the cashier who physically rings up the sale. This
attribute of Zappers allows the incidence of skimming fraud to migrate beyond the
traditional “mom and pop” stores. Zappers allow owners to place employees at the cash
register, check their performance (monitor employee theft), but then remotely skim sales
to cheat the taxman.44
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If a VAT is in place the ROT that would be lost is only the ROT on the value added at the final state.
Other taxes may be lost in full. For example, this paper has not considered the 18.4 cents per gallon federal
tax. In cases where the retailer suppresses the sale of gasoline, this tax is also lost, and would be available
to increase bottom-line profits or to reduce prices of gasoline to drive customers into the gas station where
higher profits are obtained through convenience store sales.
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See for example the use of double tills to manually skim cash receipts in the UK at Aleef Garage Ltd.
This was a £5.3 million tax fraud, and according to Steve Armitt, Group Leader HMRC Criminal
Investigations indicated, “… the investigation was made all the more difficult because of the closed ranks
of the employees involved some of whom were close family members … [t]hose involved tried to make it
as difficult as possible for the cheating to be discovered.” HMRC News Release, Company Directors Jailed
for £5million Fraud 1 (Nov. 13, 2007) available at
https://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=330199
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Federation of Tax Administrators meetings over the years).
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The IRS has uncovered Zappers in Michigan that have allegedly been used to
fund terrorist operations,45 and Revenue Quebec has litigated over 250 cases where
Zappers have been used to suppress sales in that province.46 Estimates of tax losses from
Zappers and other sales suppression technology in Illinois restaurants are approximately
$1.075 billion annually.47 Zappers are very easy to install in any ECR.
There are a number of technologies available to assist tax authorities in the
prevention of sales suppression.48 A common strategy is to require businesses that have
engaged in suppression frauds to install security devices as a condition of relicensing the
business.49 These systems encrypt and record all transactions, and preserve business
records for up to ten years.
The recommendation of this paper is that states that opt to tax gasoline sales on an
ad valorem basis should strongly consider structure the tax as an industry-specific VAT
with subjective valuation. Secondly, they need to be engaged in preventing sales
suppression by mandating that retail gasoline stations with a history of fraud install
certified recordkeeping security systems.
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Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Eastern District of Michigan, LaShish Financial Manager Sentenced
for 18 months for Tax Evasion (May 15, 2007) available at:
http://www.cybersafe.gov/tax/U.S.aopress/2007/txdv072007_5_15_ElAouar.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dept
of Justice, Eastern District of Michigan, Superseding Indictment returned Against LaShish Owner (May 30,
2007) available at: http://www.justice.gov/tax/usaopress/2007/txdv072007_5_30_chahine.pdf
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Roy Furchgott, With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard To Find, NYT C6 (August 20, 2008).
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The author’s estimate based on a comparison of Illinois and Quebec GDP on an adjusted purchase power
parity basis, and assuming that restaurant sales in Illinois are roughly comparable to those in Quebec. ie
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See the discussion of BMC Inc. development programs in Richard T. Ainsworth, Zappers – Retail VAT
Fraud INTERNATIONAL VAT MONITOR (May/ June 2010) 175. BMC responded to the Belgian
government’s need for ECR security with remote audit capability by further developing its eTax device
(which was one of the few fraud prevention devices certified under SWEDAC, the Swedish government’s
data security agency). The result of this development program was the Sales Data Controlled (SDC) that
incorporates the German government’s smart card (developed by INSIKA).
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This was the approach adopted by Judge Lise Gaboury of the Court of Quebec in the fraud case against
the 28-restaurant chain Casa Grecque. In this instance, the fraud involved installing an automated sales
skimming programme (Zapper) in the point of sale system (the networked electronic cash register). In the
Budget Speech of 23 March 2006, the Minister of Revenue had announced the adoption of an automated
fraud prevention system [module d’enregistrement des vents], which would be voluntary until 2011. Judge
Gaboury noted that the system was expected to be available by 1 October 2008 and required all of the Casa
Grecque restaurants to adopt it at this time as a condition of remaining in business. Revenue Quebec, Des
restaurants de la chaîne Casa Grecque coupables de fraude fiscal (in French only) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2006/10juillet.asp
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